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Abstract:  This paper presents a methodology applying Monte Carlo methods with delay-time 
analysis to test the effects of scheduled maintenance and inspection actions on factors affecting the 
operational efficiency of a marine system which is subject to degradation. The aim is to demonstrate 
how a Monte Carlo model incorporated into delay time analysis can be used to predict the transition 
behaviour of a system under analysis. The model presented in this paper focuses on the effects on 
system failure probability and downtime of various maintenance and inspection policies. The impact 
on spare part requirements is also investigated.   
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1. Introduction   
Maintenance and inspection policy is an important part of any study assessing Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). A number of papers are available on the subject of maintenance 
optimisation and decision making for engineering systems1-10. Maintaining key systems contributes 
substantially to the effective operation of a marine vessel. Maintenance can be described as a 
combination of all technical and administrative actions, including supervision actions, intended to 
maintain or restore a state in which the system can perform its required function11. 
Due to the large number of factors which may affect maintainability it is difficult to optimise 
maintenance and inspection policies for a given system. As well as aspects such as system 
unavailability and crew costs additional factors must be considered to ensure that the 
implementation of maintenance and inspection policies are not overly detrimental to productivity. 
Factors such as the effective stocking of spare parts can have a major influence on system operation 
due to factors such as downtime which may be incurred as a result of having insufficient spare parts 
for repair12. Spare part stocking is especially important in the marine industry as vessels will often 
operate in remote locations where the ordering of additional parts is not desirable. As well as 
ensuring that sufficient numbers of spare parts are available should a fault occur, it is important not 
to over stock due to limited space and cost factors. 
 
The degradation of components is also an important factor when assessing the maintainability of a 
system. A common method for modelling degradation is to plot the life cycle of a component using a 
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Weibull distribution3,13,14. However, extensive data is required to produce an accurate Weibull 
distribution and this data is not always readily available. Other methods have been proposed using 
simulation to model the degradation of a system15,16. These methods are of particular interest to the 
marine industry as it is difficult to obtain sufficient data, concerning reliability, over the life-time of 
marine systems due to uncertain operating conditions. 
A Monte Carlo (MC) model has been developed previously to assess the efficiency of a marine 
cooling system17. The MC model provides reliability data such as system failure probability, 
downtime and maintainable item contributions taking into account the complex nature of the 
systems transition behaviour. A method is also included in the previously developed model which 
determines the failure mode of a given transition. This updates the repair time of components based 
on the failure mode rather than relying on deterministic repair times. The model was found to 
produce accurate results for system reliability as well as useful information regarding spare part 
requirements.  
The model presented in this paper develops this MC model by focusing on modelling the effects of 
scheduled maintenance and inspection actions within the system transition logic. Additionally a 
method of modelling component degradation has been added and the manner by which spare part 
stock is assessed has been modified.  It has already been shown in previous papers that MC methods 
can be a valuable tool for the optimisation of maintenance and stock policies for deteriorating 
systems15,16,18. To implement the proposed model MC sampling has been applied in conjunction with 
an adaptation of Delay-Time Analysis (DTA). The model is intended to realistically assess the effects 
of maintenance and inspection actions in a single model by allowing said actions to have a direct 
effect on the analysis of the system under consideration.  
2. Background  
2.1 Delay - Time Analysis  
Currently the most commonly used methods for reliability and maintenance studies are based on the 
concepts of mean time to failure (MTTF), or mean time between failures (MTBF). These methods can 
often be unreliable due to the fact that they rely on data that can be inaccurate and can produce 
unrealistic estimates for reliability data. These methods can often lack sufficient testing verification 
or validation19.  
The methods of implementation for the inspection algorithms used in the model presented in this 
paper, draw largely from DTA and are applied using simulation. DTA is an alternative method for 
analysing inspection policies which provides engineers with a tool to help minimise system downtime 
as well the downtime of individual components within the system. DTA achieves this by introducing 
the idea of periodic inspection intervals. If the way in which defects arrive can be modelled along 
with their associated delay-times, the DTA concept can be applied to understand the relationship 
between inspection frequency and system failures20-22. Fig 1 illustrates how DTA models the 
behaviour of component failures. 
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Fig 1: Diagram illustrating Delay-time concepts [Adapted from Christer19]. 
In Fig 1 u represents the initial ‘tell-tale’ time at which signs of a fault may be detected and h 
represents the ‘delay-time’ from the point u, to a failure occurring. The point u is used to model the 
arrival rate of defects and the value of h determines the amount of time in which a fault may be 
detected before propagating to failure. When using DTA to assess inspection policies it is assumed 
that if an inspection occurs within the period, h, the fault is detected and a failure is prevented 
incurring a significantly reduced downtime for repair. By modelling the failure pattern of a system in 
this way DTA can compare different inspection policies to determine the best option for detecting 
the greatest amount of faults. Performing a comparison of the different options allows inspection 
policies to be implemented such that system reliability and availability are optimised. In the model 
presented in this paper DTA is applied by using MC sampling to model the arrival rate of failures to 
determine the arrival rate of defects and the initial point, u. In standard DTA the opposite is true such 
that the point, u, is used to determine when a failure will occur. For this reason the method for 
analysing inspection policies presented in this paper has been dubbed ‘reverse – DTA’. 
DTA has been previously applied using MC methods by Cunningham et al11. The process was 
separated from the rest of the model focusing only on the applicability of MC methods to DTA. 
Cunningham et al11 use MC to facilitate DTA looking at both perfect and imperfect inspections. The 
model presented by Cunningham et al11 can be considered in two parts. MC is used to generate 
arrival rate of defects and delay-times values. The analysis of optimum inspection intervals is 
considered separately.  
The model presented in this paper contains the DTA algorithm within a larger MC simulation. This is 
so that the process is contained within the modelling of the system and therefore affects the 
transition logic of the system depending on the outcome of the DTA. Rather than gathering failure 
data and applying DTA manually the inspection actions taken are intrinsically linked to the system 
behaviour. This means that the DTA process directly affects the downtime and reliability of the 
system. The system is modelled such that inspection actions are being carried out throughout the 
course of the mission time rather than looking at effects of inspection actions after the analysis has 
been performed. This means that the inspection policy itself can have an effect on the arrival rate of 
defects.  
An assumption of constant arrival rate of defects, kf, is reasonable for systems that have been 
running for a long enough period to be considered mature. This assumption is based on the idea that 
repair actions are perfect. When applying DTA with the assumption of perfect repair this is 
considered to be the case and the value, kf, follows a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP). The 
parameters for standard DTA are defined by Christer & Wang20 in detail. 
The model presented in this paper considers repair actions taken upon inspection to be imperfect. In 
this model DTA is applied in a different way to standard models. This is because the arrival of failures 





based on the value, h. The arrival of failures is obtained using MC analysis based on the failure rate, 
λ, which varies due to the degradation present in the model. Brown & Prochan23 suggest that 
imperfect repair should be considered for models looking at ‘minimal repair at failure’. When 
defining scheduled maintenance actions within the current model, repairs are considered perfect 
and λ is set to ‘as good as new’. This is not true for repair upon inspection, as it is considered that 
‘minimal repair’ actions are taken. For this reason repair actions upon inspection are considered to 
be imperfect meaning that the arrival rate of defects follows a Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process 
(NHPP). As with standard DTA it is assumed that inspections are perfect such that faults present upon 
inspection will always be identified. 
In standard DTA it is assumed that downtime is incurred upon inspection regardless of whether a 
fault is detected. This is because operational research is performed upon inspection meaning the 
dissection of certain parts is required. In the model presented in this paper it is assumed that all 
inspections are purely observational meaning that downtime is only incurred if a fault is detected 
and repair actions are required.  
2.2 Degradation of Components 
A common assumption in reliability studies is that of constant failure rate when analysing 
components during their ‘steady state’ period. Though work has been done on modelling 
degradation of components much of it requires significant historical data making it difficult to 
implement accurately3,13,14,28. Alternative approaches have been found however, using MC methods 
to model random degradation by sampling from a distribution that is a function of the failure 
probability of the component under analysis16-17.  These models randomly update the degradation of 
components at different intervals making it possible to assess when the component reaches a 
predetermined degradation threshold at which the component is considered failed. 
The study performed by Barata et al15 models degradation as a function of the failure rate. A 
degradation threshold is set based on a failure rate that is considered unacceptable for the 
component under analysis. The study performed by Cadini et al16 uses similar methods to suggest a 
model for condition-based component replacement based on degradation of active components. 
Ideas have been drawn from Cadini et al15 and Barata et al16 so that a method for determining 
random degradation can be incorporated into the model presented in this paper. A calculation has 
be implemented which is used to assess the degradation of the component which is undergoing 
transition. Based on the level of degradation the manner in which the system transitions, is altered. A 
model for random degradation has been included as degradation gives additional depth to the 
model. By taking into account degradation other aspects of the system behaviour such as repair 







Fig 2: Process of development for proposed Monte Carlo maintenance model. 
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Fig 2 illustrates the development of the proposed model. After the development of the initial MC 
model a number of improvements have been suggested to increase the scope of the model for 
decision making purposes. In order to model the effects of maintenance and inspection policies as 
well as component degradation a number of additional techniques must be defined. Additional data 
is also required for the improvement of the previously developed inventory system to assess spare 
part requirements. 
3.1 Defining the System 
The general constraints for the system behaviour of the model presented in this paper are defined by 
the logic of the initial MC model. A simple system is used to demonstrate the logic of the applied 
methods. This system is shown in Fig 3. 
Fig 3: Diagram showing the set-up of a simple system. 
The system in Fig 3 consists of two pumps each with three possible states i.e. working (W), failed (F) 
and ‘cold standby’ (SB). The system is defined such that only pump B can be in the state SB when 
pump A is working. Table 1 shows the possible states for the system. The vector B represents the 
state of the system and b1 and b2 represent the state of pump A and B respectively. 
Table 1: System states and their associated system state vector (B). 
B b1  b2  Flow Out? 
1 W SB YES 
2 W W Yes 
3 F W YES 
4 W F YES 
5 F F NO 
  
Table 1 shows the possible states for the system defined by the MC model before the modelling of 
scheduled maintenance, inspection actions and component degradation has been implemented. A 
number of additional factors must be considered, to facilitate the implementation of the new 
methods as these have a significant impact of the operational constraints of the system.  
Due to the nature of MC analysis a large number of trials are required to provide accurate data on 
item contributions for the system. To obtain accurate results the number of trials required is often in 
excess of 106. Over a number of trials a large number of failures will be attributed to each 
maintainable item and an average can be obtained by dividing the number of contributions by the 
number of trials. This is always the case when obtaining averages using MC analysis. This then shows 
how many of the total component failures are attributed to each specific part on average over the 
specified mission time. The system state vector (B) lists the possible states of each constituent 
component. Under certain conditions, a component’s state can change from one to another. 
3.2 Modelling Scheduled Maintenance     
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Over the past decade, there have been many reported developments on scheduled maintenance 
with reference to the use of DTA24. For example, a stochastic model for joint spare parts inventory 
and planned maintenance optimisation was proposed and demonstrated through the DTA developed 
for inspection modelling25,26. Another example is that the periodic inspection interval for systems 
with cold standby system was optimised using the DTA27. However, it is worth noting that the 
fundamental theory for modelling scheduled maintenance remains the same. This study uses the 
basic preventive maintenance theory incorporating the fundamental delay time concept. 
The timing of scheduled maintenance in this model is based on system operating time rather than 
the operational time of each component. The desired time period between scheduled maintenance 
for each component must be specified to determine how often maintenance will occur during the 
analysis. When a maintenance action occurs the system transitions as if the component under 
maintenance has failed, but a failure of the component is not actually logged. After maintenance has 
been completed the parameters for the component are reset and it is considered to be ‘as good as 
new’. The failure rate, λ, of the component is reset meaning degradation is set to zero, and the time 
of the next scheduled maintenance is set to the time when maintenance has been completed plus 
the predetermined period between maintenance actions. The downtime incurred by maintenance is 
also logged. If the component has failed it is considered that maintenance has been performed to 
repair the component and the values are similarly updated with the addition that a failure of the 
component is logged.  
Before scheduled maintenance actions are analysed a random transition time, T, is generated by MC 
sampling from the initial model. The component undergoing transition is also determined by MC 
sampling. Once these parameters are established the model checks which component is next for 
scheduled maintenance. For the system shown in Fig 3 this is determined by the values TMNA and 
TMNB which represent the time when maintenance is scheduled for pump A and pump B 
respectively. The model then checks whether the current transition has occurred before or after 
scheduled maintenance should have been performed. For example if it is determined that pump A is 
due for maintenance first and the system is in the nominal state, B =1, the model checks if the 
transition time, T > TMNA. If the transition time, T, exceeds the time when maintenance should occur 
a transition occurs without a component failure at the scheduled maintenance time and the values 
are updated depending on which component is under maintenance. The initial time for the analysis, 
T0, is then set to the scheduled maintenance time and the system is put back online in the 
appropriate operating condition. Fig 4 illustrates the process of such a transition. 
Fig 4: Example transition when scheduled maintenance is performed. 
Fig 4 shows that if T > TMNA the random failure obtained from MC sampling effectively does not 
occur as scheduled maintenance is performed beforehand. This changes the events which have 
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occurred in the system as a transition has taken place before the randomly sampled time. In this case 
the initial time parameter, T0, is set to TMNA and the analysis continues in state B = 2. Subsequent 
transitions will then check if pump A has become available. Once maintenance is completed the 
analysis continues from T0 = TMNA + τ, where τ is the repair or maintenance time. The value of TMNA 
is then updated as shown in Fig 4 where TMGA is the period between scheduled maintenance for 
pump A. In Fig 4 TMNA > Tm, where Tm is the mission time for the analysis, meaning no subsequent 
maintenance actions on pump A will be performed during the analysis period. It is assumed that if no 
subsequent transitions have been detected, scheduled maintenance has been performed without 
effect on the system.  
In Fig 4 the value, MAIN (1) has been presented. This is a value which determines the nature of the 
transition of pump A. For example, if MAIN (C) = 1 the transition has been caused by scheduled 
maintenance and if MAIN (C) = 0 the transition has been caused by a random failure, where, C, is a 
value representing the component under analysis (i.e. C = 1 and 2 for pumps A and B respectively). 
This has been implemented to reduce the number of system states. Note that if MAIN (C) = 1, a 
component failure is not logged by the model. The addition of scheduled maintenance gives rise to a 
number of additional system states. This is due to the fact that each component can be in the states 
W, F, and SB as well as the additional case of the component being under scheduled maintenance. 
Table 2 shows the system states for the system in Fig 3 when maintenance is possible where, ‘M’ 
signifies that the component is under maintenance.  
Table 2: Possible system states for maintenance model test case. 
B b1 b2 
1 W SB 
2 W W 
3 W M 
4 W F 
5 M W 
6 M M 
7 M F 
8 F W 
9 F M 
10 F F 
 
The value, MAIN(C), allows the system states shown in Table 2 to be reduced to those presented in 
Table 1. Rather than defining the logic for an entirely different system state an algorithm is 
implemented based on MAIN(C) to determine the nature of the previous transition. Looking at Table 
2 it can be considered that B=3 and B=4 are the same system state with certain variables modified 
based on the value of MAIN(C) from the previous transition. It is important to update this value as it 
can determine whether or not a system failure occurs later in the analysis. If a component failure 
causes the system to become unavailable and the value of MAIN(C) = 0 for the previous transition 
then a system failure, SF, will be logged as both components are failed. If the value of MAIN(C) = 1 for 
the previous transition however, system downtime is logged but SF is not updated as it is considered 
that the previous component is not failed as it has been taken offline voluntarily.  
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Consider again the case where pump A is scheduled for maintenance next. If the transition time, T < 
TMNA, then no subsequent maintenance actions have yet been performed and the system 
transitions as if a random component transition has occurred. If it is determined that a failure has 
occurred, the system will transition at T. At this point corrective maintenance is performed on the 
failed component in the same manner as if the component had been taken offline for scheduled 
maintenance. The key difference with this mode of transition, aside from the time at which the 
failure has occurred, is the value of MAIN(C). The value of MAIN(C) is 0 rather than 1 showing that 
the component is failed rather than under scheduled maintenance. The value of TMNA is still 
updated upon the component coming back online as actions equivalent to scheduled maintenance 
have been performed upon the failure occurring.  
The model has been defined such that scheduled maintenance will not occur if taking the component 
offline for maintenance will cause the system to become unavailable. If this is the case the 
maintenance schedule for the system is delayed by the period between the time when scheduled 
maintenance should have occurred and the time when a sufficient number of components are online 
such that taking a component offline for maintenance will not lead to system unavailability. This 
means that the system cannot enter a state equivalent to that of B = 6 in Table 2. The state B = 9 is 
still viable as the failure of pump A may occur after pump B has been subject to maintenance.  
It is important that the model determines component downtimes due to scheduled maintenance 
between the time of last transition, T0 and Tm where no subsequent transitions have occurred. At the 
end of each trial the model checks how many maintenance actions are scheduled to occur between 
T0 (equal to 0 if no transition occurs previously) and Tm. Once this is established the model updates 
the component downtimes due to maintenance before exiting for the next trial.  
3.3 Modelling Inspection Actions   
When modelling inspection actions it is considered that any corrective repairs performed upon the 
detection of a fault incur less downtime than scheduled maintenance or random failures as only 
‘minimal repair’ actions are performed. If a fault is identified upon inspection the repair actions 
performed are considered to be imperfect and the component is subject to random degradation. 
Unlike scheduled maintenance, inspections are performed based on the operational time of 
components rather than system operating time meaning that only components which are active will 
be inspected.  
A form of DTA has been applied within the MC analysis to allow the effects of varying inspection 
policies to be modelled in a single analysis. Rather than generating fault occurrences, MC sampling is 
used to provide component failure times for the initial developed model. Using so called, ‘reverse-
DTA’ inspections are analysed by looking at the time of failure.  Then by using a predetermined h 
value the model works backwards to find the initial point, u. With this the model is capable of 








Fig 5: Illustration of inspection analysis. 
At point 1 in Fig 5 the failure time, T, is obtained by MC sampling. At point 2 the time at which the 
initial ‘tell-tale’ sign, u, occurs is identified by moving backward by the value of h. With this 
established the model checks whether an inspection has been performed between u and T to 
determine whether the fault has been identified. The points marked ‘A’ represent inspection actions 
for a policy which would fail to identify the fault. Conversely the points marked ‘B’ represent an 
inspection policy in which the fault would be identified. Note that the value, TIG, is the predetermined 
gap between inspection actions. The desired time between inspections must be defined to 
determine how often the components are to be inspected. The calculation in Equation 1 determines 
how many inspections will occur during the mission time. 
                                                                  𝑁𝐼 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇(𝑏)(𝑇𝑚 ÷ 𝑇𝐼𝐺)                                                                  (1) 
where: 
NI = No. of inspection actions throughout the proposed mission time; 
Tm = Mission time for the analysis. 
NB. The function, INT (b), in Equation 1 rounds the value to largest integer value not exceeding b, 
where b is equal to TM ÷TIG.  
The delay-time, h, is defined by the user based on the components within the system. When a 
transition occurs the current operating time of the component which has caused the transition must 
be determined. This is calculated as shown in Equation 2. 
                                                               𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑁 = 𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂 + (𝑇 − 𝑇0)                                                                  (2) 
where: 
OPCN = Operating time of the component at transition time, T (current operating time); 
OPCO = Previous operating time of component (operating time when previous transition occurred; 
equals zero at start of each trial); 
T = Transition Time (Actual time transition occurs within the mission time of the analysis); 
T0 = Initial Time (Actual time at point of previous transition; equals zero at start of each trial). 
When considering a system with multiple components the operating time must be updated for each 
of the active components at the point of transition. The operational time of the component is used to 
determine if the latest inspection has identified a fault before a failure occurs. If the inspection fails 
to identify the fault the system transitions due to a random component failure at time, T. If the 
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inspection identifies the fault, the transition occurs based on the level of degradation of the 
component. If the degradation level exceeds the maximum value it is considered that the component 
is equivalent to being failed and the component will transition in the same manner as if a random 
failure has occurred at the time the fault is detected (FT). If the degradation level is acceptable the 
component will transition at time, FT, but the downtime incurred is reduced by IR, which is the factor 
by which the repair time is reduced if a fault is addressed during inspection before it has propagated 
to failure.  
With maintenance and random failures spare parts are required for repair. This is not true when 
corrective maintenance is performed upon inspection as it is considered that ‘minimal repair’ is 
performed as the component has not yet failed. However, as ‘minimal repair’ is performed the 
component is not ‘as good as new’ and the degradation level is not reset to zero23.  
3.4 Modelling Component Degradation 
Intermittent data regarding the state of the components throughout their lifetime is not readily 
available for marine systems. Due to the lack of data for the components in this study, it is not 
possible to generate a suitably accurate distribution for degradation over time. A method for 
modelling degradation has been incorporated in the current model however, as neglecting 
degradation would decrease the scope of other methods which have been applied. For the purpose 
of this model degradation is considered to be random and is represented by modelling the 
degradation as a modification of the failure rate, 𝜆, for the component under analysis. If a fault is 
detected upon inspection it is considered that the component is no longer ‘as good as new’ and the 
component is randomly degraded. This raises the failure rate for the component increasing the 
likelihood that the component will fail later in the mission time. The calculation for random 
degradation as a function of the component failure rate can be seen in Equation 3. 
                                                                      𝜆𝑀 = (𝑅𝐷 × 𝜆) +  𝜆𝑀
∗
                                                                                                                    (3) 
where: 
λM = Component failure rate modified by degradation; 
𝜆𝑀
∗  = Component failure rate before the modification due to further degradation; 
RD = Random variable, U ~ [0,1); 
λ = Nominal component failure rate. 
Equation 3 is performed upon inspection and the value of λM determines the manner in which the 
component transitions. The degradation threshold is defined by the value λMAX. The value of λMAX 
represents a component failure rate which is considered to present an unacceptable risk. If, λM ≥ 
λMAX, the component is in excess of the degradation threshold and is considered to be in a state, 
equivalent to failure. 
If it is found that, λM ≥ λMAX, maintenance is performed and the degradation is reset so that λM = λ, 
representing that the component is ‘as good as new’. This also occurs if repairs are performed on the 
component due to scheduled maintenance or corrective maintenance following a random failure. 
Though maintenance is performed if a fault is found upon inspection, the value of λM remains the 
same due to the ‘minimal repair’ actions performed. This presents a downside to inspection repairs 
as the system will be operating at a reduced level of reliability for a longer period of time. 
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Modelling degradation in this way gives scheduled maintenance actions additional meaning within 
the model. By resetting the degradation upon scheduled maintenance it means that the risk of taking 
a component offline for a period of time can have a positive effect on the long term reliability of the 
system.  
3.5 Modification of Inventory System 
An inventory system has been previously developed using MC sampling and data from an OREDA 
study29 to provide results for the contribution of specific replacement parts within a system17. The 
initial model has limited scope due to incomplete data and the fact that only one replacement part is 
attributed to each failure. The number of replacement parts for a maintainable item is usually much 
smaller than 1 (i.e. << 1) within the mission time17. Additional data has been gathered and 
modifications have been made to increase the scope of this inventory system.  
Improved data has been acquired from OREDA30 in which the information on part contributions is 
more comprehensive than that used previously. Due to the fact that the data has been acquired has 
been taken from offshore installations certain item contributions have been omitted as some factors 
do not apply to components operating specifically in the marine industry. Schematics for the 
components under analysis have been obtained showing the parts which can be replaced within each 
component. The parts shown in the schematics which are required for repair due to each of the item 
contribution stated in OREDA30 have been determined by consulting an expert with over 15 years of 
experience as a chief engineer. The spare part requirements for each failure have been modelled in 
the system logic so that the model provides data on how many of each of the parts contained within 
the schematic are required over a specified mission time. It is also taken into consideration that 
certain items contributions require multiple parts for repairs to be performed due to ‘knock-on’ 
effects.  
The effect of scheduled maintenance on spare part requirements has also been modelled. Certain 
items for each active component are always replaced during scheduled maintenance. To incorporate 
this into the model an algorithm has been implemented to update the number of the relevant spare 
parts required when scheduled maintenance is performed on a specific component. 
3.6 Mapping System Transition Logic & Code Generation 
Once the methods have been established it is necessary to map the system transition logic using flow 
charts. The previously developed MC model is used as a basis for this process but the additional 
methods presented significantly alter the possibilities for system transitions. 
With the logic of the system determined completely, Fortran code is generated to model the 
processes of the newly applied methods within the system under analysis. With this complete the 
simulation is run for a large number of trials (N) to aggregate the results for the key parameters 
under analysis. 
4. Case Study 
The proposed model has been applied for use to optimise maintenance and inspection policies as 
well as spare part stocking options. The system for which the model has been applied is the main 
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engine sea water cooling system taken from the “MV Hamnavoe”, a RO/RO passenger ferry. The 
component layout for the system under analysis is shown in Fig 6. 
 
Fig 6: Simplified cooling system under consideration [Adapted from Cunningham et al 28]. 
The components V1, V2, V3, P1, P2, P3, PC1 and PC2 represent valve 1, valve 2, valve 3, pump 1, 
pump 2, pump 3, plate cooler 1 and plate cooler 2 respectively. There are eight components in the 
system under analysis, each with three possible states, working, failed or standby (W, F or SB), giving 
rise to 38 = 6,561 system states. The state SB can be grouped with W, as although components in SB 
are offline they are still available and the transition from SB to W is instantaneous. This gives rise to 
28 = 256 system states. Though there are 8 components only five are operating at any given time, 
namely two valves, two pumps and one plate cooler. The system is defined such that a minimum of 
two vales, two pumps and one plate cooler must be available for the system to operate properly. By 
considering the operational constraints and using Boolean Representation Method (BRM) the 
number of possible system states is reduced to 34; with 21 working states and 13 failed states. The 
basic logic for the working states is defined by the initial MC model with all other states resulting in 
system unavailability.  
The failure rate for each component has been taken from OREDA30 and the system failure rate (λS) is 
the sum of the failure rates for the active components. Each component has a number of different 
failure modes incurring different failure mode specific repair times and maintainable item 
contributions. Modifications have been made to the initial MC model to incorporate the new 
methods employed, but the general constraints of the system remain the same with regard to basic 
failures. Some key factors must be addressed when applying the proposed methods to the cooling 
system under analysis. 
The degradation threshold must be set relating to the failure rate, λ, for each component. For this 
case study the system has been defined such that a component is considered failed if its modified 
failure rate, λM, is over double the nominal value (i.e. λMAX = (λ×2)). Additionally the policies for 
scheduled maintenance and inspection actions under analysis must be defined to determine the 
scope of the analysis. This is performed by defining the time between these actions so that it can be 
determined how often these actions occur for the system within the mission time, Tm. The value, Tm 
for this case study is based on an analysis period of 1 year (i.e. 8760 hours). As previously stated 
inspections only incur downtime if a fault is detected and the downtime incurred is significantly 
reduced. The value, IR, determining the factor by which downtime is reduced when repairs are 
performed pre-emptively upon fault detection is ¼ of the failure mode specific repair time. The 
downtime incurred by scheduled maintenance actions has been defined as slightly higher than the 
average repair time for each component as it is considered that a thorough analysis is performed 










For the cooling system presented, multiple component operating times must be updated upon 
transition whether they have caused the transition or not. This is because although they may be in a 
steady state they are still operational and simulated inspections are being performed without 
incident. For this reason the component operating times of all active components are updated by the 
same amount as the increase in the operational time of the component undergoing transition during 
the current system state.  
As scheduled maintenance is performed at specified points within the mission time it means that 
components which are not active may still be scheduled for maintenance. When a transition occurs 
in the cooling system, the maintenance scheduling of all components must be checked. As scheduled 
maintenance causes a change in the system state vector, B, it is only the earliest scheduled 
maintenance action which affects the current transition. After the effects of scheduled maintenance 
have been analysed the maintenance schedule for the system is updated accordingly and the analysis 
continues. 
An integer value, C, has been assigned to each component in the system which alters certain key 
values based on the component undergoing transition. For components V1, V2, V3, P1, P2, P3, PC1 
and PC2 the integer value of C is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively. The value applies to the time of 
next scheduled maintenance action (TMN (C)), the time at which components are brought back 
online (TT (C)), the operational time of components (OP (C)), the component failure rates (λ (C)/λm 
(C)), component downtimes (DT (C)) and the modifier MAIN (C). This has been done to make the 
modelling of the system transition logic more efficient as many system states behave in the same 
manner with only the specific component variables being affected.  
In the previously developed MC model the value for the system failure rate, λS, was constant 
throughout this analysis17. This is no longer true due to the degradation model. Due to degradation 
the failure rate for each component can be altered. This additional factor means that a calculation 
must be performed before the transition time, T, is sampled. This updates the value of λS to equal the 
sum of the failure rates of the components which are active taking into account their current level of 
degradation. The degradation level of individual components affects the nature of transitions by 
inspection as well as determining whether or not spare parts are required for repair. Unlike 
scheduled maintenance actions repairs are always performed if a fault is detected upon inspection 
regardless of the system state.  
With the parameters for the analysis defined the methods can be applied to model the system 
transition logic of the cooling system incorporating the effects of the new methods. Though there are 
21 different working states for the cooling system the transition logic can be separated into four 
distinct types based on the condition of the system. This is such that many of the system states 
follow the same patterns as others regarding logic but the variables within the logic change 
depending on the system state. The four working conditions affecting the transition logic for the 
system are defined as follows: 
 Condition 1: The system is in the nominal state; all components are subject to maintenance; 
system downtime cannot occur directly. 
 Condition 2: A single plate cooler is failed/under maintenance; maintenance actions cannot be 




 Condition 3: A single valve/pump is failed/under maintenance; maintenance actions cannot be 
performed on valves or pumps; system downtime can be caused by an additional failure of 
either a valve or a pump. 
 Condition 4: A single valve/pump plus a single plate cooler are failed/under maintenance; 
maintenance actions cannot be performed on any component without system unavailability; 
the failure of any subsequent component will result in system downtime. 
Any other parameters than those defined by Conditions 1-4 will result in the system being in a state 
other than working. This could be offline due to maintenance or failed. With this, detailed flow 
diagrams of each working state can be produced to illustrate the system transition logic. The logic for 
the system is the same for all states operating under the same condition; it is only the variables 
which are updated that are altered based on the specific components which have undergone 
transition. 
Once the system transition logic has been determined for all system states, the inventory algorithm 
and the final calculations are applied to complete the model. The final calculations aggregate the 
results found during the MC analysis to provide average values.  
5. Results  
Results obtained by the application of the proposed model to the cooling system are now presented. 
Firstly the model has been applied to the same case as the previously developed MC model to test 
the effects of the newly applied methods. The model has then been applied to the case study in 
Section 4 for varying maintenance and inspection policies to assess optimal policies for the system 
over a specified mission time. Finally the convergence of the MC model is tested to ensure the results 
remain accurate for varying values of N. The reliability data such as failure rates, failure mode specific 
repair times and maintainable item contributions for components in the system has been taken from 
OREDA30. The data is based on ball valves, centrifugal machinery pumps and plate heat exchangers. 
For comprehensive data on these components consult OREDA30. As previously stated the downtime 
associated with scheduled maintenance differs from the data in OREDA30. The downtime incurred by 
scheduled maintenance actions is higher than the average downtime for each component. The 
downtimes for scheduled maintenance have been set to 10 hours, 30 hours and 14 hours for valves, 
pumps and plate coolers respectively. The reduction factor in downtime incurred for repairs upon 
inspection is constant for all components at ¼ of the repair time incurred by the selected failure 
mode. 
5.1 Test Results 
The first stage in gathering results is to check whether the new methods affect the model in a 
manner that is expected. Testing is necessary to ensure the model is working correctly before further 
results are obtained for analysis. This also serves as partial validation of the proposed methods. A 
number of result sets have been gathered from the model where certain aspects of the new methods 
are omitted. This is done by setting the times for maintenance and inspection intervals to much 
higher than the mission time, Tm. The methods are still present within the model but they have no 
effect on the system operation as their associated actions never occur. These tests are performed 
using the same operational constraints and mission time as the case for which the previous MC 
model was applied. The different results sets are explained below. 
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 Result Set 1: Scheduled maintenance and inspection actions are omitted. 
 Result Set 2: Scheduled maintenance is omitted but inspection actions are included.  
 Result Set 3: Inspection actions are omitted but scheduled maintenance is included.  
 Result Set 4: Inspection actions and scheduled maintenance are included (Complete model). 
It should also be noted that where inspection actions are omitted no component degradation is 
present. The mission time, Tm, for which each test is performed, is equal to 532. The number of trials, 
N, is set to 107 as this provides a suitable level of accuracy in the results. Table 3 shows the output 
values for key reliability data obtained for each of the result sets. 
Table 3: Results obtained from various tests excluding certain aspects of the proposed model. 
 Result Set 1 Result Set 2 Result Set 3 Result Set 4 
FV1 1.08E-02 8.04E-03 3.39E-03 2.48E-03 
FV2 2.69E-04 1.17E-04 5.04E-04 3.01E-04 
FV3 1.08E-02 8.10E-03 3.72E-03 2.76E-03 
FP1 4.19E-01 3.20E-01 1.31E-01 9.74E-02 
FP2 1.04E-02 4.68E-03 1.94E-02 1.19E-02 
FP3 4.19E-01 3.20E-01 1.45E-01 1.07E-01 
FPC1 9.90E-03 7.41E-03 3.49E-03 2.54E-03 
FPC2 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 3.00E-07 2.30E-07 
DTV1 1.31E-01 1.06E-01 1.99E+01 1.99E+01 
DTV2 3.33E-03 1.74E-03 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 
DTV3 1.32E-01 1.07E-01 2.00E+01 2.00E+01 
DTP1 5.06E+00 4.17E+00 8.95E+01 8.92E+01 
DTP2 1.25E-01 6.82E-02 8.97E+01 8.97E+01 
DTP3 5.06E+00 4.18E+00 8.91E+01 8.88E+01 
DTPC1 1.39E-01 1.12E-01 1.40E+01 1.40E+01 
DTPC2 1.44E-05 1.12E-05 1.40E+01 1.40E+01 
DTS 1.28E-01 7.95E-02 4.57E-01 3.87E-01 
FSYS 2.13E-02 1.10E-02 6.61E-03 3.23E-03 
PSF 2.11E-02 1.09E-02 6.58E-03 3.23E-03 
 
Probability of system failure (PSF) and average downtime of the system (DTS) are highlighted in Table 
3 as they are the key values of interest for the analysis. This is because the analysis focuses on the 
effect to the system as a whole rather than the individual components within the system. The 
average number of failures for the system (FSYS) is also provided. Values relating to individual 
components are also presented. The variables FV1, FV2, FV3, FP1, FP2, FP3, FPC1 and FPC2 show the 
number of failures for valve 1, valve 2, valve 3, pump 1, pump 2, pump 3, plate cooler 1 and plate 
cooler 2 respectively. Additionally the variables DTV1, DTV2, DTV3, DTP1, DTP2, DTP3, DTPC1 and 
DTPC2 show the downtimes for valve 1, valve 2, valve 3, pump 1, pump 2, pump 3, plate cooler 1 and 
plate cooler 2 respectively. The mission time over which the analysis runs regarding the results 
shown in Table 3 is relatively short when considering maintenance scheduling.  
Results Set 1 is the initial test with all maintenance and inspection actions omitted. When applying 
the same reliability data from OREDA30 to the previously developed MC Model it is found the these 
results are in agreement showing that the model works correctly with the maintenance and 
inspection schedules set outside of the mission time. This shows that with maintenance and 
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inspection omitted the core workings of the model remain the same despite the significant 
alterations to the transition logic.  
With the introduction of inspections in Result Set 2 a reduction in system downtime and failure 
probability can be seen. The inspection intervals for this test have been set to 24 hours. The 
reduction is expected as inspections introduce a possibility of component failures being prevented as 
well as incurring a significantly reduced downtime upon taking the component offline.  
With the introduction of scheduled maintenance in Result Set 3 it can be seen that while the failure 
probability is significantly reduced, the downtime of both the system and individual components is 
noticeably increased. Though this is to be expected the increase in downtime is more apparent in this 
test due to the relatively short mission time. With components being taken offline voluntarily the 
component downtimes are increased due to the fact that they will always be taken offline within the 
mission time. This also affects the system downtime as it means that with components being offline 
more frequently, if a random failure does occur, the likelihood that it will occur when another 
component is under maintenance is increased giving a greater chance the system to become 
unavailable. The increased downtime incurred by maintenance also emphasizes this effect. Though 
the downtime is increased the failure probability is reduced as the maintenance actions can stop the 
majority of component failures from occurring by performing preventative repair actions. The time 
periods between maintenance actions for this test have been set to 250 hours, 125 hours and 300 
hours for valves, pumps and plate coolers respectively. Note that pumps are maintained more 
frequently due to their significantly higher failure rate; this practice has been used throughout this 
analysis.  
Finally in Result Set 4, where the model is fully operational it can be seen that the output values are 
somewhat of a hybrid between Result Set 2 and Result Set 3. This is such that the system failure 
probability is reduced further and the system downtime lies between Result Sets 2 and 3. This is 
because both maintenance and inspection actions, increase the reliability of the system but have 
opposite effects on the downtime of the system.  
As well as the reliability data shown in Table 3 the effect on spare part requirements for Results Sets 
1-4 has also been observed. The most significant change to spare part requirements can be found for 
Result Set 3 when scheduled maintenance is added. This is because certain items are always replaced 
during scheduled maintenance meaning that the demand for these items is affected significantly 
depending on the frequency of maintenance actions. Some sample data has been taken looking at 
the average requirement of seals for pumps in the test cases to highlight this effect. In Result Set 1 
the average requirement for pump seals is 3.21 × 10-1 whereas in Result Set 3 the requirement is 
increased to 8.9417. Also the addition of inspection actions lowers the spare part requirements 
slightly. This is because repairs upon inspection assume that no parts are replaced meaning there is 
less chance of spare parts being needed.  
5.2 Case Study Results 
The frequency of scheduled maintenance actions has been altered whilst keeping the frequency of 
inspection actions constant. The maintenance schedule is altered by changing the input variables 
representing the period between maintenance actions. The maintenance of pumps occurs much 
more frequently than the other components due to a significantly higher failure rate. The 
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maintenance schedules have been assigned to the model with this criterion in mind. When looking at 
the results of the analysis shown in Figs 7 and 8 it is the maintenance interval for pumps which the 
results are concerned. This is because the analysis is more sensitive to the maintenance of pumps 
than that of valves and plate coolers due to the increased number of transitions attributed to pumps. 
Table 4 shows the corresponding values for the maintenance intervals of valves and plate coolers 
when compared with pumps. 
Table 4: Showing maintenance increments used for analysis of case study. 
 MAINTENANCE INTERVAL (Hours) 
Pumps Valves Plate Coolers 
1 720 2,000 2,500 
2 1,720 3,000 3,500 
3 2,720 4,000 4,500 
4 4,720 6,000 6,500 
5 6,720 8,000 8,500 
6 9,720 10,000 10,500 
 
Table 4 shows the maintenance intervals for each stage of the analysis. The purpose of altering the 
maintenance frequency in this way is to determine how it affects key output values obtained from 
the model. The maintenance intervals have been assigned taking into account their mean time to 
failure (MTTF). The initial settings for maintenance shown in the first row of Table 4 are assigned 
such that scheduled maintenance occurs before the MTTF. The mission time has been set to 1 year 
(8760 hours) for the analysis. Taking this into account the MTTF of both valves and plate coolers is 
much higher than the mission time used for the analysis. For this reason the maintenance intervals 
for valves and plate coolers are set to arbitrary values that are significantly higher than that of 
pumps. After the initial settings the maintenance intervals are increased by equal amounts for all 
components. The policy stated in row 6 of Table 4 represents a case where no maintenance actions 
take place as they are outside of the mission time. Inspections have been defined such that they take 
place every 24 hours and the delay-time, h, is equal to 6 hours. Figs 7 and 8 show the results of the 


































Fig 7: Graph showing how PSF varies as maintenance frequency is altered (Tm = 8760 hours) 
 
Fig 8: Graph showing how DTS varies as maintenance frequency is altered (Tm = 8760 hours). 
It can be seen in Figs 7 and 8 that in general as the frequency of maintenance actions decreases the 
probability of system failure (PSF) increases and the system downtime (DTS) decreases. This is as 
expected due to the downtime associated with maintenance as well as the potential to prevent 
failures.  At one point in Fig 7 however, there is a spike in the value of PSF and then a reduction 
with the next setting for maintenance frequency. This indicates that by setting the maintenance 
frequency to some value within this range it has caused the system to behave differently deviating 
from the usual pattern. It should be noted that at these points scheduled maintenance actions only 
take place once within the mission time it is only the time at which scheduled maintenance occurs 
which has changed. This indicates that the frequency of scheduled maintenance is not the only 
factor which affects the systems operation. The anomaly is also present at the same point for DTS 
in Fig 8. This shows that for the defined maintenance and inspection policies, the model identifies a 
point which minimises downtime at the cost of a slightly increased PSF value. The fact that the rest 
































correctly as intended. This means that it is unlikely that the aberration in the results is due to an 
error in the model. This result is something that was not possible to predict but provides an 
indication of an optimum policy for reducing downtime in the system. This provides useful 
information for decision making which may not be apparent with other analysis techniques.  
In addition to the results shown in Figs 7 and 8 results have been obtained regarding how 
maintenance scheduling affects the number of spare parts required for the system. Tables 5 and 6 
show some sample data for spare part requirements.  
Table 5: Showing spare part requirements for maintenance policy (1). 
VAVLES: PUMPS: PLATE COOLERS: 
PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED 
Body 2.55E-02 Pump Casing 8.61E-02 O-Ring 6.04E+00 
Bumper 5.79E-02 Pump Cover 8.61E-02   
Packing Nut 7.73E-02 Impeller 7.00E-01   
O-Ring(3_3) 1.18E+01 Shaft Key 4.78E-01   
O-Ring(2_3) 1.18E+01 Wear Ring 2.66E+01   
Stem 3.10E-02 Bearing Bush 2.62E+01   
Ball 1.18E+01 Bearing Plug 2.70E-01   
Handle 7.11E-02 Pump Shaft 3.98E-01   
Pin 7.11E-02 Distance Ring 8.61E-02   
Body Cap 9.21E-03 Mechanical Seal 3.13E+01   
O-Ring (1) 1.18E+01 Grease Seal 1.72E-01   
Spring 1.18E+01 Bearing Cover 5.40E-01   
Seat 1.18E+01 Bearing Housing 5.40E-01   
Positioner 1.50E-02 Circlip 2.70E-01   
  Bearing Sleeve 2.62E+01   
  Ball Bearing 5.32E+01   
  Propeller Shaft 3.35E-01   
  Motor Coupling 1.14E-01   
  O-Ring 9.37E+01   
  Seal 3.07E+01   
  Lubricating Nipple 2.40E-01   
  Grease Plug 1.20E-01   
  Drain Plug 5.20E+01   
  Lubricating Pipe 1.20E-01   
  Pump Foot 6.46E-01   
  Motor Pedestal 1.14E-01   
  Actuating Device 8.61E-02   
  Diaphragm 8.61E-02   
  Filter(s) 2.29E-01   
  Filter, Cyclone 9.32E-01   
  Flow, Indicator 9.35E-01   
  Pressure, Indicator 1.73E+00   
  
Temperature, 
Indicator 6.95E-01   
  
Vibration, 
Indicator 6.19E-01   
  
Power Supply(3 
Ph) 8.61E-02   





Table 6: Showing spare part requirements for maintenance policy (4). 
(N=10^7, TM=8760, OREDA (2009), TMGV= 6000, TMGP = 4720, TMGPC = 6500, TIG =24, h = 6) 
VAVLES: PUMPS: PLATE COOLERS: 
PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED PART NAME  
NUMBER 
REQUIRED 
Body 2.79E-02 Pump Casing 9.57E-02 O-Ring 2.05E+00 
Bumper 6.30E-02 Pump Cover 9.57E-02   
Packing Nut 8.41E-02 Impeller 7.77E-01   
O-Ring(3_3) 2.91E+00 Shaft Key 5.31E-01   
O-Ring(2_3) 2.91E+00 Wear Ring 1.84E+00   
Stem 3.42E-02 Bearing Bush 1.36E+00   
Ball 2.88E+00 Bearing Plug 3.01E-01   
Handle 7.73E-02 Pump Shaft 4.41E-01   
Pin 7.73E-02 Distance Ring 9.57E-02   
Body Cap 1.02E-02 Mechanical Seal 7.06E+00   
O-Ring (1) 2.90E+00 Grease Seal 1.91E-01   
Spring 2.86E+00 Bearing Cover 6.02E-01   
Seat 2.90E+00 Bearing Housing 6.02E-01   
Positioner 1.65E-02 Circlip 3.01E-01   
  Bearing Sleeve 1.36E+00   
  Ball Bearing 3.72E+00   
  Propeller Shaft 3.72E-01   
  Motor Coupling 1.27E-01   
  O-Ring 2.09E+01   
  Seal 6.38E+00   
  Lubricating Nipple 2.67E-01   
  Grease Plug 1.33E-01   
  Drain Plug 2.31E+00   
  Lubricating Pipe 1.33E-01   
  Pump Foot 7.18E-01   
  Motor Pedestal 1.27E-01   
  Actuating Device 9.57E-02   
  Diaphragm 9.57E-02   
  Filter(s) 2.53E-01   
  Filter, Cyclone 1.03E+00   
  Flow, Indicator 1.04E+00   
  Pressure, Indicator 1.92E+00   
  
Temperature, 
Indicator 7.71E-01   
  Vibration, Indicator 6.86E-01   
  Power Supply(3 Ph) 9.57E-02   
  Priming Unit 8.39E-01   
 
As expected decreasing the frequency of scheduled maintenance generally decreases the average 
amount of parts needed. This is not the case for all parts however; the parts required upon 
scheduled maintenance drop noticeably whereas demand for other parts is increased. This is because 
more random failures are occurring allowing parts to contribute to failure which would not, if 
adequate maintenance had been performed. 
The results from the analysis for varying inspection intervals are now presented. As with scheduled 
maintenance the inspection analysis is performed by keeping the frequency of scheduled 
maintenance constant. The intervals for scheduled maintenance for this analysis are 720, 2000 and 
2500 hours for pumps valves and plate coolers respectively. It is well understood that different 
components would have different delay times due to their failure modes and other reasons such as 
operational conditions. However, for ease of demonstration of the proposed approach, the delay-
time, h, for all inspection policies has been set 6 hours as this is significantly lower than the lowest 
inspection interval as well as being high enough so that the effects of inspection are apparent. The 
inspection intervals that have been used for this analysis are 1 day (24 hours), 2 days (48 hours), 1 
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week (168 hours), 1 month (672 hours), 6 months (4032 hours) and 10,000 hours (over a year). The 
initial inspection interval is set to 24 hours as it has been suggested by expert opinion that this is 
standard practice for inspections on marine vessels. The intervals are increased progressively with 
the final value being such that inspection does not occur during the time of analysis. For the analysis 
of the case study the inspection intervals are the same for all components. Figs 9 and 10 show the 
results of this analysis.  
Fig 9: Graph showing how PSF varies as the inspection interval is altered (Tm = 8760 hours). 
Fig 10: Graph showing how DTS varies as the inspection interval is altered (Tm = 8760 hours). 
As can be seen in Figs 9 and 10 both the system failure probability and downtime increase as the 
interval between inspection actions increases. This is as expected as inspection actions have a chance 
to reduce downtime as well as preventing certain component failures. It can be seen from this 
analysis that there is no disadvantage to regular inspections and inspecting the system more 
frequently increases its operational efficiency by reducing downtime and increasing reliability. This is 






























































identified. Inspections are considered to be observational meaning a component does not have to be 
taken offline for an inspection to be performed. The model has been defined in this way to reflect 
inspections which take place whilst a vessel is in operation. This would not be the case if standard 
DTA had been applied to the model as it is considered that operational research is performed 
requiring components to be taken offline.  
The spare part requirements for the system are also reduced when more frequent inspections are 
performed. This is because ‘minimal repair’ actions are taken upon a fault being detected and it is 
considered that no spare parts are required for these actions. For example when inspections are 
performed every 24 hours, the average requirement for mechanical seals is 31 units for the specified 
maintenance schedule. For the same maintenance schedule the average requirement for mechanical 
seals is increased to 32 units when inspections are performed every 48 hours. Though inspection 
intervals affect the number of spare part required, the impact is far less significant than when 
altering scheduled maintenance actions.  
The degradation algorithm also becomes a factor when inspection actions are in place as it means 
that components can be operating with reduced reliability. With scheduled maintenance in place 
however it is possible for the system to repair degradation at certain scheduled points meaning the 
likelihood that degradation will propagate to failure is reduced. For the results obtained it is found 
that the benefit of inspections outweighs the fact that unavailability may be experienced due to the 
analysis of degradation upon inspection.   
5.3 Convergence of Results 
Finally the accuracy of the results obtained from the model must be tested. The model has been 
tested for the case study for a varied number of trials, N. This has been done to test the scope of the 
proposed MC model. It is necessary to determine that the results are suitably accurate and do not 
diverge. The test has been performed using the initial maintenance frequencies shown in row 1 of 
Table 4. The standard inspection interval of 24 hours is also in place. Figs 11 and 12 show the 
convergence of PSF and DTS as the value of N is increased.  

































Fig 12: Graph showing convergence of DTS as number of trials, N is increased. 
As can be seen in Figs 11 and 12 the results for both PSF and DTS converge at around 107 trials with 
only a slight variation as the number of trials is increased. The difference between the results from 
106 and 107 trials is around 0.3% and 0.1% for PSF and DTS respectively. The variation in the results is 
suitably low such that it can be considered insignificant showing that the results obtained are valid 
for a number of N values. For the case study results an N value of 107 has been used as it provides 
suitably accurate results in a manner that is efficient. 
6. Discussion  
Looking at the results for varying maintenance schedules the outputs from the model are largely as 
expected. It can be seen that the highest level of maintenance is where the system is most reliable. 
However, in general it can be said that that lower maintenance frequencies are better for the system 
due to significantly reduced downtime and spare part requirements. These reductions far outweigh 
the increased reliability experienced due to frequent maintenance. As with PSF an anomaly is found 
for the results regarding DTS for the maintenance policy stated in row 4 of Table 4. Unlike the results 
for PSF the results at this point represent a minimum for system downtime. This means that row 4 of 
Table 4 represents the best maintenance policy for optimising system availability. 
The anomaly shown in Figs 7 and 8 has not been anticipated and is of significant interest to the 
analysis of the model. Dubi32 states that the assertion that systems have a “monotone” behaviour i.e. 
that improving any unit in the system improves the system is unfounded in reality, suggesting that it 
is not always possible to predict the effects of varying factors for complex systems using analytical 
methods. The anomalous result indicates that the model has identified something that changes the 
effect of scheduled maintenance when applied at the points specified. The model is capable of 
identifying a critical point in the analysis which would be difficult to determine using standard 
methods. This is a very useful function of the model as it can be seen that the point where this 
aberration occurs is actually a minimum for system downtime with the reliability being slightly higher 
than other options with low downtimes. This provides the optimum level of maintenance scheduling 
when the inspection policy is set to a daily bases. When inspection actions are taken every 24 hours 
the optimum frequencies for maintenance actions are 6,000, 4,720 and 6,500 hours for valves, 




































When analysing the system for various inspection policies the results obtained are as expected. 
Having regular inspections decreases probability of system failure as well as the system downtime. 
This indicates, for the purpose of this study, that there is no disadvantage to increasing the regularity 
of inspection actions. Downtime due to inspection is not significant in this model as inspections are 
considered to be observational and downtime is only considered when a fault is found. As in the 
manufacturing industry, for which DTA was initially developed, it is required in the marine industry 
that inspections are implemented requiring component dissection which in-turn incurs downtime. 
Unlike the manufacturing industry these inspections are generally performed during periods of 
inactivity such as when a vessel is dry-docked. As the model presented is concerned only with the 
operating time of the system the assumption of no downtime for inspections is valid when applying 
DTA in the marine industry. In the case where a fault is found upon inspection the downtime is lower 
than for a random failure meaning that inspections only serve to increase availability.  If man-hours 
for inspections are also considered it would be the case that more regular inspections yield a higher 
level of man-hours. This is undesirable due to cost factors and the adverse effect it would have on 
the efficiency of crew management.   
7. Conclusion  
The purpose of the model presented in this paper is to provide data on the effects of scheduled 
maintenance and inspections for a system in the marine industry to facilitate decision making. 
Factors such as these can have a significant effect on efficiency as they contribute to reliability as 
well as cost factors associated with system operation. 
The results for the case study presented in this paper serve to show how MC analysis can be used in 
conjunction with methods such as DTA to provide comprehensive data on the effects maintenance 
and inspection policies for a system that is subject to degradation. The model is applied using the 
proposed methods such that the complexities of the operation of the cooling system are reflected in 
the results obtained. Applying the proposed methods in a single model allows maintenance and 
inspection policies to have a real effect on the system rather than performing a separate analysis 
once the behaviour of the system is defined. This allows optimisation decisions to be made with a 
high degree of confidence as the model reflects real parameters which affect the operational 
efficiency of marine systems.  
By modifying a previously developed method the model is capable of determining how altering 
maintenance and inspection policies affects the number of spare parts required for the mission time. 
This analysis of spare part stock control is useful when considering repair or replace options for key 
components within a system. By combining the proposed methods data is provided for aspects 
including reliability, availability and spare part requirements for varying parameters. In addition the 
model is able to identify factors which are hard to determine using analytical methods due to the 
complexity with which the system under analysis is modelled.  
The data obtained from the model in this chapter can be used to perform analyses for optimising key 
factors which are critical to the efficiency of marine operations. It is suggested that the data obtained 
from this model is suitable to facilitate a cost-benefit analysis to be used for further analysis of the 
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